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this is not possible, free riding in monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat 
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other, which shows that non-cooperative monitoring does not necessarily lead to excessive 
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It is not uncommon to ﬁnd situations where several principals monitor a common agent: a worker
may have multiple supervisors, a bank may have multiple regulators, a ﬁrm may borrow from
diﬀerent banks, and individuals are taxed by multiple authorities. Our focus here is on contexts
where multiple principals attempt to obtain income from a privately informed agent, such as in
t h ec a s eo fm u l t i p l eﬁnanciers. While this problem of costly repayment enforcement has been
widely studied in the case of one principal and one agent1, little attention has been paid so far to
the strategic interactions between multiple principals arising in those environments.
Consider the case of multiple ﬁnanciers engaged in an income division game with a common
agent. In our model, principals can use two instruments to extract the returns of a project. They
can monitor the agent and they can demand a transfer from the agent. Monitoring comprises of all
the costly instruments aimed at verifying and obtaining income from the agent once it is realized,
like certiﬁcation of balance sheets, supervision, shareholders’ legal actions, etc. When coordination
problems between principals are not severe so that monitoring can be centralized, there is excessive
monitoring compared to when the ﬁnanciers cooperate, and proﬁt-sharing schemes (or equity-
like contracts) are optimal. If coordination problems are severe such that ﬁnanciers choose their
monitoring eﬀorts independently, free riding in monitoring eﬀorts reduces the incentive to monitor
and it is optimal not to monitor high proﬁt levels. That is, the repayment is non-contingent on
proﬁtw h e np r o ﬁt levels are high and contracts have debt-like features. Furthermore, free riding
may be so strong that there may even be less monitoring compared to when the ﬁnanciers fully
cooperate and merge as one. Therefore, we show that non-cooperative contracting does not
necessarily lead to excessive monitoring.
In some environments, monitoring activities are coordinated, while in others they are not. For
example, in publicly-traded companies there are many providers of funds and there might also
be diﬀerent classes of security holders, but there is also in place a set of rules and institutions
(auditors, bankruptcy courts, disclosure rules) aimed at guaranteeing coordinated access to prof-
its and information to all outside providers of funds. In these environments each principal or
ﬁnancier can demand potentially diﬀerent transfers from the entrepreneur or agent but there is
still a centralized governance mechanism that limits the amount of income an agent can retain
by monitoring on behalf of all ﬁnanciers. On the other hand, situations also abound where no
common institution can be constructed to extract the returns of the project. This is the case when
the activity is too idiosyncratic and information sensitive (e.g. at the early stages of a company’s
development). Also, in privately held companies or when the ﬁnanciers provide large amounts of
funds, each has the incentive and the skills to independently aﬀect the extraction of income both
1See for example, the classic pieces by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Border and Sobel (1987).
1through monitoring and through the transfers.2
To present the intuition behind our main results, we take as a benchmark the merged principals
case where the principals can coordinate both monitoring and contracting. Consider then an
environment where principals are able to verify each others monitoring eﬀorts, so that monitoring
can be coordinated or centralized, but each ﬁnancier can demand potentially diﬀerent transfers
from the entrepreneur. For instance, each ﬁnancier may independently arrange for private transfers
based on the information revealed by a central monitor. We ﬁnd that there will be greater
monitoring and rent extraction than if the principals merged together. This happens even though
monitoring results in a public good — its beneﬁt is shared by the principals. Each principal derives
a positive externality from the others’ contracts, which negates the public good problem. Roughly,
by decreasing the repayment he requests from the agent and relying more on direct monitoring, a
given principal attempts to induce other principals to believe that proﬁt is low and to reduce the
repayments they respectively ask for.
If the principals do not cooperate in monitoring and choose their eﬀorts independently, we say
monitoring is decentralized. In this case, there is free riding in monitoring eﬀorts and consequently,
the positive externality from the other principals’ contracts is now counteracted by a negative
externality since each principal under-provides monitoring eﬀort. We show that, in equilibrium,
the second force dominates and we obtain a number of results. Not only there is less monitoring
than in the centralized case, but there also exist equilibria which involve less monitoring than even
in the merged principals case. Free riding between principals leads to a collapse of monitoring
for high proﬁt levels and principals rely instead on constant transfers, which introduce debt-like
features in the ﬁnancial contracts.3 This is in contrast to the case of centralized monitoring, where
proﬁt sharing contracts are optimal. It is also worth noting that a zero-monitoring region arises in
our model because of contractual externalities and not from an assumption about the monitoring
technology as in the well-known costly state veriﬁcation (CSV) approach. In the CSV models, the
optimality of debt contracts is typically derived from an assumption of constant marginal cost of
verifying income or an arbitrary restriction to deterministic auditing.4
The point that equity is more useful in settings where monitoring costs are low has also been
n o t e db yB o y da n dS m i t h( 1 9 9 9 ) ,w h os h o wt h a tt h e optimal mix of debt and equity in a company’s
liability structure depends on the observability of the returns of the underlying assets. When it
is possible to combine investment technologies with diﬀerences in observability of the returns, the
2See for example Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Pagano and Röell (1998).
3The reduction of monitoring when principals choose eﬀorts independently, may be seen as another example of
the parallel that Tirole (2001) draws between low-powered incentives in multi-principal problems and in multi-task
agency, where it is important not to make payments too sensitive to the performance of a single task to the detriment
of attention to other tasks.
4See for example, Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985), and Freixas and Rochet (1998).
2technology with unobservable returns is funded with debt while the technology with observable
returns leads to equity ﬁnancing.
Since Diamond (1984) it is well known that delegating monitoring activity to a common or
centralized monitor avoids duplication when many ﬁnanciers are involved in ﬁnancing a project.
Our ﬁndings, however, challenge the notion that non-cooperative contracting leads to excessive
monitoring with respect to the merged principals case. As indicated above, we ﬁnd that the validity
of this claim depends on the type of monitoring arrangement (centralized or decentralized) the
non-cooperative ﬁnanciers follow. Our result that there is less monitoring in the decentralized
case than in the centralized case is linked to Carletti (2004), where two-bank lending may be
preferred to single bank lending because single-bank lending results in excessive monitoring in a
moral hazard setting.
The issue of multiple lending in models of costly repayment enforcement has been rarely
tackled. The early studies that focused on delegated monitoring following Diamond (1984) do
not look at the strategic interaction between ﬁnanciers. A paper closely related to ours is Winton
(1995) that studies how seniority of creditors reduces the amount of costly auditing. Besides using
ad i ﬀerent monitoring technology, that paper does not consider the strategic interactions between
ﬁnanciers using a common agency framework as we have done.
Contractual externalities have also been identiﬁed to be important in the context of multiple
lending. Tirole (2002) argues that investors do not have incentive to take into account the impact
of the various elements of their lending relationship (level and structure of investment, monitoring,
and exercise of control rights) on the returns of the other investors. In a moral hazard setting,
Bizer and DeMarzo (1992) show that when agents may borrow sequentially from several lenders,
the level of indebtedness increases with respect to the case in which the borrower can commit to
borrow from one bank only.
I nt h i sp a p e rw et a k ea sg i v e nt h ep r e s e n c eo fm u l t i p l eﬁnanciers, but it is easy to argue why
that may be so. A ﬁrst set of reasons has to do with diversiﬁcation. For instance the separation
of ownership and control in public companies where many investors, often small and dispersed,
hire professional managers to run ﬁrms raises issues of multiple funding. Diversiﬁcation is also
the reason for multiple sources of funds in syndicated loans, LDCs lending, and when regulations
prevent banks from gaining control of ﬁrms, or limit the exposure of a ﬁnancial institution to a
single risk. Lenders may simply be resource constrained as in Dewatripont and Maskin (1989).
Other reasons are related to information: multiple lending may limit a bank’s information rents
at an interim stage (Hellwig (1991), Rajan (1992)), provides protection against information loss
following a bank’s distress (Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000)), deters strategic default by
making reorganization more costly (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), and makes the soft-budget-
3constraint problem less severe (Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)). Multiple banking relations may
also result from the trade oﬀ between the costs of eﬀort duplication and sharing of monitoring
beneﬁts on the one hand, and the beneﬁt from the diseconomies of scale in monitoring each bank
faces when monitoring alone on the other hand (Carletti (2004)). Funding may also arise as a
by product of another trade. For example, in trade credit, multiple lending occurs when several
suppliers provide inputs to the same customer that does not pay cash. Finally, in a model with
complete information, Parlour and Rajan (2001) show that multiple contracting in an unsecured
credit market is an equilibrium outcome when the borrower’s default payoﬀ is increasing in the
number of loans accepted.
Although cast in the realm of ﬁnancial contracting, our paper also contributes to the more
general theory of common agency under adverse selection.5 This literature has analyzed contrac-
tual externalities between competing mechanism designers when principals may control diﬀerent
“activities” of a common agent who has private information about some parameter relevant for
contracting. In our ﬁnancial contract framework, these “activities” correspond to the monitoring
eﬀorts of each principal and the agent has private information on realized income. At a general
level, the literature has stressed the ineﬃciency in rent extraction that arises in such contexts
and how contractual externalities depend on whether the contracting activity controlled by one
principal aﬀects directly or not the utility function of competing mechanism designers.6 Direct ex-
ternalities are present in our framework as a ﬁnancier beneﬁts when others monitor. We show that
these externalities play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the structure of contracts. Understanding
how limits on contracting aﬀect outcomes is precisely the task that we undertake below in our
ﬁnancial contracting environment when we compare the contractual outcomes which arise when
ﬁnanciers can verify and contract over the monitoring eﬀorts of others and when they cannot. In
that respect, this paper contributes to the literature on incomplete contracting by tracing out in-
eﬃciencies and contractual forms as contracts are less and less comprehensive. We show therefore
that transaction costs that prevent comprehensive and cooperative contracting have a signiﬁcant
impact on the shapes of observed ﬁnancial contracts. Equity-like contracts emerge for environ-
ments with low transaction costs, i.e., when the principals can verify each other’s monitoring
5Applications already span several ﬁelds. Laﬀont and Tirole (1991) analyze regulation; Martimort (1992 and
1996), Mezzetti (1997) and Stole (1997) deal with non-linear pricing and manufacturer-retailers relationships; Biais,
Martimort and Rochet (2000) study competing market-makers in ﬁnancial markets. Martimort and Stole (2002)
and Peters (2001, 2003) oﬀer theoretical frameworks to understand what are the natural classes of mechanisms to
be studied. For models of common agency under moral hazard, see Bernheim and Whinston (1985 and 1986) among
others.
6For instance, Martimort and Stole (2003) analyze a common retailer-manufacturers example. See also the more
abstract framework of Peters (2003) who stresses the role of direct externalities between the principal on the kind
of mechanisms which can be used. Segal (1999) oﬀers a framework for dealing with contractual externalities under
complete information but reverses the role of the principal and the agents.
4eﬀorts, whereas debt-like features appear otherwise.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the basic model. In Section 3 we
analyze the case where principals cooperate. In Section 4 we move to the case where principals
play non-cooperatively in transfers but cooperate in monitoring eﬀorts. In Section 5 we consider
the case where principals compete both in transfers and in monitoring. We conclude in Section 6.
Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2T h e M o d e l
An investment project needs two inputs: capital and the service of a specialized agent. The agent
has zero wealth so outsiders must provide funds if the project is to be realized. We assume that
two principals (ﬁnanciers) P1 and P2 who do not have the skills to realize the project provide
the agent with funds. Technically, we consider a case of intrinsic common agency, i.e., without
funding from both principals, the project would not be realized.7 For simplicity, we assume that
each principal provides half the funding. The agent’s task is to use his specialized skills to realize
the project and deliver the realized proﬁt to the principals. The investment of ﬁxed size returns a
stochastic proﬁt θ, the state of nature, with θ ≤ θ ≤ θ where the lowest bound on proﬁti sθ > 0.
Except when explicitly stated, we will also assume that ¯ θ < ∞. The parameter θ has a density
function f(θ) > 0 for all θ, a cumulative distribution function F(θ), and, for technical reasons
that will be clear later, a weakly decreasing hazard rate
1−F(θ)
f(θ) . The principals and agent are risk
neutral.
We consider an environment in which the agent is able to observe the realization of the proﬁt
or income, θ, while the principals know only its distribution. This gives the agent the opportunity
to keep some of the realized proﬁt instead of delivering all to the principals. Thus, we follow a
large literature including both the costly state veriﬁcation (CSV) models (Townsend (1978), and
Gale and Hellwig (1985)), and more broadly recent analyses of how company insiders may try
to expropriate outside investors (see e.g., Pagano and Röell (1998), La Porta, et al. (2002) and
Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002)).
Once proﬁt is realized, each principal Pk can devote an eﬀort pk ∈ [0,1],k=1 ,2, monitoring
the agent to verify and recover realized proﬁt. We assume that the monitoring eﬀort made
by a principal is observable both by this principal and the agent and can be contracted upon
by those two parties. Monitoring with overall eﬀort q makes a fraction q ∈ [0,1] of realized
income θ veriﬁable, which the principals can therefore recoup. We will assume that the monitoring
7For example, each ﬁnancier is resource constrained and can only ﬁnance part of the capital needed to implement
the project. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) make a similar assumption.
5technology links the individual monitoring eﬀorts of the principals to the fraction q through the
formula q = Q(p1,p 2)=p1 + p2 − p1p2. This fraction q increases thus with the monitoring
eﬀorts pk, and thus monitoring by one principal beneﬁts also the other principal. However the
marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n ge ﬀort by one principal decreases as the other himself exerts a higher
eﬀort. This captures the fact that the actions of the principals may result in wasteful monitoring
duplications.8 Monitoring eﬀort for principal Pk comes at a cost given by the function C (pk),
where C(0) = 0,C0 (pk) > 0 for pk > 0,C 00 (pk) > 0 for all pk,a n dC(·) satisﬁes the Inada
conditions C0 (0) = 0,C0 (1) = ∞.
We therefore model in a stylized fashion one of the central issues of corporate governance:
namely that outsiders must spend resources to induce insiders to pay out. Our analysis focuses on
the strategic aspects of the use of these resources by non-cooperating principals. In the corporate
environment monitoring eﬀort can take various forms. It can represent the use of institutions like
lawyers, certiﬁed public accountants, auditors, bankruptcy courts, independent directors, and legal
actions by shareholders. These actions help verify realized income and recover it for outsiders. The
strength of such actions is typically inversely related to performance: in other words, we expect
to ﬁnd that the principals will scrutinize the agent more intensively the less income the agent
pretends to have had. Of course, the extent to which these monitoring actions can be pursued
depends on the legal environment (La Porta, et al. (1998)).
To alleviate the need to exert monitoring eﬀort, the principals may also ask for a transfer
from the agent. Thus, we assume that the agent pays an amount tk to each principal. If there
were full information, each principal would use only tk to obtain their share of the proﬁt. Under
asymmetric information however, the principals could get at most θ if they relied on transfers
alone. The principals’ monitoring eﬀorts not only allow them to directly recover a part of realized
proﬁt, but may also allow them to obtain higher transfers, for example, by designing contracts
that trigger greater monitoring eﬀort for smaller transfers. Thus, the total fraction of income that
accrues to the principals is
qθ+t1+t2
θ , where q represents the direct impact of recovery eﬀort.
The yield from the principals’ monitoring eﬀorts, qθ, is divided equally between the principals.
Thus a principal Pk’s payoﬀ is the transfer from the agent plus half the veriﬁed proﬁtm i n u st h e
cost of the monitoring eﬀo r to ft h a tp r i n c i p a l :
Wk = tk +
qθ
2
− C (pk). (1)
The agent’s payoﬀ is the part of realized theta that does not accrue to the principals net of the
transfers:
U =( 1− q)θ − t1 − t2. (2)
8In footnote 20, in Section 5, we discuss the implications if the marginal impact of one principal’s eﬀort on q
increased with the other principal’s eﬀort.
6The agent is protected by limited liability so that U ≥ 0 for every proﬁt level, and the opportunity
cost for the agent’s skills is normalized to zero. Thus, the agent’s payoﬀ represents the rent
from private information about θ as limited by the two instruments the principals can employ —
monitoring and transfers. In reality, this rent is likely to be a combination of explicit and implicit
rewards. Executive compensation oﬀers an example of explicit rewards: both the level of executive
pay and the importance of performance pay indicate that executive compensation packages are
often structured to deal with agents who have an informational advantage. On the contrary, in
less sophisticated ﬁnancial contexts, payments of information rents may also take implicit forms
like tunneling, corporate perks, etc., or outright theft. More generally the information rent is
a component of the control rights that informed insiders can obtain at the expense of outside
investors and that can be found in diﬀerent degrees in all types of ﬁnancial systems.
The principals’ opportunity cost of funds and the monitoring cost are small enough so that
the participation constraint of each principal never binds. Normalizing the principals’ opportunity
cost of funds and the size of the investment to one, we must thus have the expected value of Wk to
be greater than 1
2, a condition that we assume to be satisﬁed in this analysis, and which necessarily
holds when uncertainty on types, ¯ θ − θ, is small enough.
We end the description of the model by presenting the timing of the game. At t =1the
principals oﬀer contracts, deﬁned in terms of transfers and monitoring eﬀorts, and investment
takes place. At t =2income is realized, and only the agent learns it. At t =3 , the agent pays a
transfer and the principals monitor to verify and recover income.
3 Cooperative contracting or “merged” principals
We begin by presenting a benchmark with no strategic interaction between the principals. Thus
we assume that both principals P1 and P2 can cooperate fully in their monitoring eﬀorts pk as if
they are “merged” as one, and they oﬀer a joint contract t(·). For the rest of this section we will
thus refer to the merged principals in the singular.
Contract setting: In this fully cooperative environment, each principal can verify the other’s
eﬀort and the transfer received from the agent. Thus the merged principal chooses the monitoring
eﬀorts p1 and p2 to minimize the joint cost for any overall eﬀort q. Remembering that q =
p1 + p2 − p1p2, t h ec o s to fi m p l e m e n t i n gq when the principals merge is denoted by ˜ C(·),9 which
9Since the principals contract on total eﬀort q, in this section and the next, we could have simply used a cost
function C(q) and let the principals share this total cost. As will become clear later, the main reason to introduce
this function ˜ C(·) is to have a cost of eﬀort function that is comparable across cases when principals coordinate and
do not coordinate their monitoring eﬀorts.
7is the solution to the cost minimization problem:
˜ C (q)=m i n
p1,p2
C (p1)+C (p2), (P ˜ C)
s.t. q = p1 + p2 − p1p2.
We make the necessary technical assumptions to ensure that ˜ C(·) is well behaved and that this
cost minimization is achieved for an interior symmetric solution such that q = p(2 − p).10 Those
conditions are presented in the Appendix as Lemma 1.
The merged principal oﬀers a joint contract based on the total monitoring eﬀort q, denoted by
t(q), i.e., the agent is oﬀered a menu of options from which he chooses which repayment and associ-
ated monitoring eﬀort he prefers.11 Hence, instead of working with direct revelation mechanisms,
we work here with indirect mechanisms, i.e., nonlinear schedules mapping the agent’s choice of a
q into a payment t to the principal. The Revelation Principle is then replaced by the Taxation
Principle.12 The motivation for doing so is twofold. On the one hand, the theoretical work on
common agency, which we will rely on later when analyzing the non-cooperative case, has stressed
that direct revelation mechanisms might be of little help in competing contracts environments.
Instead, the Taxation Principle still applies.13 On the other hand, direct mechanisms are artiﬁcial
theoretical tools, even with a merged principal. Direct communication of the agent’s type to the
principal is only relevant insofar it determines the fraction q of veriﬁed income and one may as
well let the agent choose directly this latter payoﬀ-relevant variable.
Recall the timing of the game. First, the principal oﬀers the contract t(q), which is a menu
of ordered pairs of transfers and monitoring eﬀorts. Second, the agent learns θ. Third, given the
contract and conditional on realized θ, the agent chooses the pair of transfer and monitoring eﬀort
that will be implemented; monitoring takes place, the principal receives qθ+t(q), while the agent
keeps the rest θ − qθ − t(q).
Anticipating the agent’s choice given a contract: We can deﬁne the agent’s information
10It is worth stressing that, in the absence of such assumptions on C(·), cost minimization may be achieved for
an asymmetric solution, for instance p1 = q and p2 =0 . This means that eﬃciency considerations require that
only one monitor is used even when principals merge perfectly. We leave for future research the analysis of these
asymmetric situations.
11Of course, these mechanisms inherit the usual caveat on commitment, and we will assume that the principal
is committed to implement the q that is chosen by the agent. Khalil and Parigi (1998) analyze the case where
the principal cannot commit to audit in a CSV model. See also Krasa and Villamil (2000) who show that debt is
optimal if the principal cannot commit to enforce contracts.
12See Rochet (1985).
13Martimort and Stole (2003) show that focusing on the set of nonlinear prices may allow a complete characteri-
zation of pure strategy equilibria with non-random mechanisms in common agency environments similar to that we
analyze here. On this see also Peters (2001).
8rent as:
U(θ)=m a x
q (1 − q)θ − t(q), (3)
and limited liability requires that:
U(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ. (4)
The agent’s private information implies that any choice q(θ) made by an agent having obtained
ap r o ﬁt θ must be incentive compatible. The incentive compatibility constraint can be obtained
from U (θ) using the Envelope Theorem; namely:
˙ U(θ)=1− q(θ) for all θ. (5)
Standard revealed-preference arguments show also that q(·) (resp. t(·)) is decreasing (resp. in-
creasing) with respect to θ and thus a.e. diﬀerentiable with a derivative such that:
˙ q(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. (6)
Note that (6) is also the second-order condition associated with (3). The conditions (5) and (6)
capture the essence of the incentive problem and conform to familiar intuitions of contracting
problems under hidden information. The only way to reduce the rent of the agent is by increasing
q(·), and to discourage the agent from “understating” income, q(·) must be decreasing in θ.
To see precisely how the principal inﬂuences the agent’s choice of q(θ), using the a.e. diﬀeren-
tiability of the repayment schedule t(·), we explicitly state the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition with
respect to q that is associated with (3):
−θ = t0(q(θ)) < 0 for all θ. (7)
Therefore, to induce the agent to choose a higher q, the principal must reduce the repayment, by
reducing the slope of t(·). We refer to this reduction14 in t0(q(θ)) as the marginal incentive cost of
inducing a unit increase in q(θ), which is in addition to the physical marginal cost ˜ C0(q(θ)) borne
by the principal. Exploring how this cost changes in the common agency setting will be a key
theme of the paper and will help explain the various results we obtain.
Now we can present the principal’s problem in the merged or cooperative benchmark, denoted
thereafter by (Pm). The principal chooses the eﬀort q(·) and the monetary payment t(·) to







− ˜ C (q(θ)) + θq(θ)+t(q(θ))
´
dθ (Pm)
s.t. (3), (4), (5) and (6).
14Since t
0(q(θ)) is negative, a reduction here means making t
0(q(θ)) even more negative.
9Using the superscript m to refer to optimal values of the merged case, we present the ﬁrst set
of results. (See also Figure 1.)
Proposition 1 The optimal contract oﬀered when the principals merge as one entails:




for all θ, (8)
with no monitoring eﬀort applied only for the highest proﬁt level, yielding qm(¯ θ)=0 .
• A total payment by the agent, qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)), that is increasing and concave in θ.
Proof In the Appendix.
Condition (8) is familiar from incentive problems with hidden information. An increase in q(x)
discourages “understatement” of income by all θ >x .Hence, the marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n g
q(x) is the reduction of rent by a unit for all θ >x ,given by 1 − F(x), which is balanced against
the expected marginal cost f(x) ˜ C0(q(x)). Monitoring is optimal except for the highest proﬁt, and
monitoring increases as outcomes get worse. Our result indicates that the agent is held to account
more intensively if he pretends to have had bad luck, a feature of many instances where monitoring
takes place after agents’ actions.
The total payment is also concave for this very reason: at the margin, the principal’s abil-
ity to increase the total payment decreases since incentive compatibility requires that q(·) be
non-increasing. Therefore, the total payment from the agent to the merged principal resembles
dividends paid to outside equity holders in that the repayment grows with proﬁt but never absorbs
all the proﬁt. The agent is the residual claimant and his payoﬀ resembles that of an inside equity
holder that keeps an increasing proportion of proﬁt. With better outcomes the importance of
transfers to extract proﬁt increases relative to monitoring.
If the marginal cost of monitoring were constant, say c, (8) would be replaced by the condition





and q(θ)=1otherwise. The optimal contract is then a debt contract such that the entire proﬁti s
extracted for low θ and no monitoring for high proﬁt levels. By assuming a monitoring technology
with decreasing returns we will stress in Section 5 how contracts may acquire debt-like features
due to strategic reasons only.
10We deﬁne by pm(·) the individual monitoring eﬀort of a given principal that solves problem
P ˜ C and minimizes the total cost of monitoring given qm(·). We have qm(θ)=pm(θ)(2 − pm(θ))
and it is easy to check that (8) becomes:





for all θ, (10)
where the joint cost function ˜ C(·) is replaced by the primitive individual cost function C(·).
This expression will be useful to perform comparisons with the case where the principals do not
cooperate in monitoring that we present in Section 5.
4 Non-Cooperative Contracts and Centralized Monitoring Ef-
forts
Even if monitoring is centralized under a common governance mechanism, common agency issues
can aﬀect the outcome of the monitoring game. In this section, we illustrate this using a case
w h e r ep r i n c i p a l sh a v ed i r e c tn o n - c oo pe r a t i v eﬁnancial relationships with the agent. Financiers may
independently arrange for private transfers but agree to rely on a common monitoring technology
to verify and recover income whose cost they bear (e.g. a bankruptcy court or a third party that
monitors on their behalf). By altering one’s contract, each principal aﬀects the agent’s choice and
thus tries to use the agent to mislead the other principal. Therefore, even though monitoring is
centralized, if the principals cannot coordinate their contracts, each principal derives a positive
externality from the other principal’s contract, and in equilibrium, there is more monitoring than
in the cooperative case. As a result, all parties are worse oﬀ — the principals and the agent.
This implies that when monitoring is centralized, it is important to limit uncoordinated direct
relationships between principals and the common agent. For example, in syndicated loans the
lead manager performs exactly the function of preventing side contracting between each lender
and the borrower.
Contract setting: We now consider situations where the two principals choose their contracts
tk(q) for k =1 ,2, non-cooperatively. We assume, for simplicity, that the principals share equally
the cost and proceeds from centralized monitoring: each principal bears half the cost of q,
˜ C(q)
2 ,
and each receives half of the recovered proﬁt,
qθ
2 .15 As is readily seen, the analysis in this section
also captures the case where the principals are able to delegate the monitoring activity (without
further agency cost) and they share the cost of the delegated monitor that exerts an eﬀort q.
The principals compete by simultaneously oﬀering the nonlinear transfer schemes tk(q), with
15Instead of
1
2, if the principals had used the fractions λ and (1 − λ) to divide cost and extracted proﬁt, the
equilibrium level of monitoring would remain unchanged, characterized by condition (13) in Proposition 2.
11k =1 ,2. Given the two contracts, after observing θ, the agent chooses the transfers and associated
monitoring eﬀort that will be implemented. For technical purposes, we also restrict attention to
contracts which are diﬀerentiable almost everywhere.16 We will look for a Nash equilibrium in
diﬀerentiable contracts {tc
1 (q);tc
2 (q)} (thereafter an equilibrium) where the superscript c refers
to equilibrium values in the centralized monitoring case.
Externality from P2’s contract – anticipating the agent’s choice given tc
2(q):We
intend to compute P1’s best response to a nonlinear contract tc
2 (·) oﬀered by P2, and the ﬁrst
step is to anticipate the agent’s choice of q to a contract oﬀered by P1. Rewriting the agent’s
problem in the case of two principals competing in transfers we obtain the following expression of
the agent’s information rent:
U (θ)=m a x
q (1 − q)θ − t1 (q) − tc
2 (q) for all θ. (11)
Applying the Envelope Theorem to (11) again yields (5). Similarly, second-order conditions are
still characterized by (6) as in the cooperative or merged principals’ case of Section 3.
The strategic interaction between the principals is best illustrated by showing how P1’s mar-
ginal incentive cost of inducing an increase in q changes compared to the case of the merged
principals. For any nonlinear schedule t1(·) oﬀered by P1, the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition associ-
ated with (11) becomes:
θ + t0
1 (q(θ)) + tc0
2 (q(θ)) = 0 for all θ. (12)
Just as in the previous case, P1 needs to lower the marginal repayment t0
1(·) to induce a marginal
increase in the choice of monitoring q.H o w e v e r , P1 also needs now to anticipate the eﬀect of
the equilibrium contract of P2 on the agent’s behavior. Given the equilibrium contract tc
2(·), an
increase in q at a given θ implies a movement along the schedule tc
2(·).17 In the Appendix, we
show that tc
2(q) is decreasing and convex in a symmetric equilibrium. The term tc0
2 (·) in condition
(12) captures the fact that the agent pays a smaller transfer to P2 if the agent chooses a higher
monitoring intensity q(θ), given tc
2(·). The intuition goes as follows: since an agent with a higher
proﬁt chooses to be monitored less (˙ q(θ) ≤ 0),P 1 “tricks” P2 into believing that the realized
income is lower by inducing an increase in monitoring q(θ), which induces P2 to ask for a lower
transfer.
16This is a standard restriction in common agency games. See Martimort (1992) and Stole (1997).
17To be more precise, any such movement along the schedule t
c
2(·) is only possible if this latter schedule is
suﬃciently extended for monitoring eﬀorts which are out of the equilibrium set (the same will be true also in the
case of decentralized monitoring eﬀorts). These extensions are not really a diﬃculty here. It suﬃces to ﬁnd a twice
diﬀerentiable extension of the equilibrium schedule over the interval [p(0),1]. See Martimort (1992) for such an
analysis.
12Of course, in equilibrium the principals are not tricked, but this incentive externality that each
principal’s contract bestows upon the other principal, leads to a greater amount of monitoring
under non-cooperative contracting than in the benchmark case. If we take as a measure of total
welfare the sum of the two principals and the agent’s payoﬀs, we can easily observe that total
welfare is maximized when the expected cost of the monitoring eﬀort is minimized given that
the size of proﬁt is exogenous.18 Thus we interpret the greater amount of monitoring under
non-cooperative contracting as too much monitoring.
We report the main results of this section (see also Figure 1):
Proposition 2 The unique equilibrium of the non-cooperative program where the principals coor-
dinate in choosing their monitoring eﬀorts is symmetric with tc
1(q)=tc
2(q)=tc(q) and it entails:
• A total monitoring eﬀort, qc(θ), given by





for all θ, (13)
that is non-increasing in θ with no monitoring eﬀort for the highest proﬁt level only, yielding
qc(¯ θ)=0 .
• A total monitoring eﬀort that is higher than the cooperative or merged case, qc(θ) >q m(θ)
for θ < ¯ θ.
• A total payment by the agent, θq(θ)+2 tc(q(θ)), that is increasing and concave in θ;i ti s
higher than the total payment under the merged case for all θ > θ.
Proof In the Appendix.
Externality and excessive monitoring: Even though the incentive externality identiﬁed
above plays a critical role, we need to account for two other eﬀects to explain why there is more
monitoring relative to cooperative contracting. First, monitoring is a public good as an increase
in monitoring results in the other principal obtaining half of qθ. Second, each principal incurs only
half the marginal cost of monitoring. We show below that the reduction in P1’s incentive cost due
to P2’s contract exactly negates the ﬁrst eﬀect, i.e., the loss to P2 of half the extracted income
from monitoring. Thus, it is the second eﬀect, the shared cost of monitoring, that determines the
increase in q(θ) relative to the merged principals case, and this is captured in condition (13).
18We assume that it is not possible to sell the project to the common agent. Otherwise, the best outcome would
of course be to give the project to the agent and never to monitor.
13To see the argument more precisely, let us reproduce P1’s best response from the Appendix.
The total eﬀort that P1 would like to implement in a best response to P2’s contract tc
2(·), is given










2 (q(θ)) for all θ. (14)
It is useful to contrast this expression with condition (8) of the previous section where the principals
are merged as one. In the current case, each principal pays half the marginal cost of monitoring
an agent with proﬁt θ, but does not capture the entire marginal beneﬁt
1−F(θ)
f(θ) from reducing the
information rent of this agent in case his proﬁt is higher than θ. The other principal takes away θ
2.
The ﬁnal term represents the externality that P2’s contract exerts on P1: the marginal incentive
cost of inducing a unit increase in q(θ) is lowered by the amount −tc0
2(q(θ)) as we saw in (12).
Were it not for this externality, the marginal beneﬁt of monitoring would become negative when









f(θ) is decreasing in θ ensures that there exists a unique θ∗ such that θ < θ∗ < ¯ θ
when θf(θ) < 2, i.e., if θ and/or f(θ) is small enough, an assumption that we will make from now
on. The externality results in monitoring of all but the highest proﬁtl e v e l ,b u tw i t h o u ti tt h e r e
would be zero monitoring for proﬁt levels greater than θ∗.
We will argue here that the incentive externality and the “leakage” of θ
2 to the other principal
cancel each other and we obtain the identiﬁed condition (13) to characterize the outcome qc(θ).
Condition (12) shows that the principals share the marginal incentive cost of inducing an increase
in q. Since the agent’s utility is separable in transfers, this burden is exactly equal to the extra
income extracted, where θ represents the marginal extracted income due to a unit increase in q(θ).
Since the equilibrium is symmetric, we have tc0(q(θ)) = −θ
2. Thus P1’s incentive cost of inducing
a marginal increase in q is half the amount of what it was in the cooperative case, which was
given by condition (7). Then, condition (14) shows that the marginal beneﬁt from increasing q(θ)
is exactly the same as in the cooperative case, while the marginal cost to P1 is halved, which
leads to excessive monitoring. Now we can apply the standard intuition for negative externalities:
P1 does not take into account that given the contract tc
2(·),P 2’s return declines as P1 induces a
higher monitoring eﬀort, which results in higher monitoring in equilibrium.
Insert Figure 1 here.
14From the incentive constraint (5), we know that the rent is lower if q(·) is higher. Hence,
common agency leads to too much extraction of the agent’s information rent:
Uc(θ) <U m(θ) for all θ
except for the lowest level of proﬁt where those two rents are both equal to zero. All parties prefer
cooperative or merged contracting to non-cooperative contracting under centralized monitoring.
While total payment to each principal is higher, each principal’s payoﬀ as well as welfare (i.e.,
the sum of payoﬀs of the principals and the agent) is lower under non-cooperative contracting.
Therefore, our analysis suggests that it is important to limit uncoordinated side contracts between
principals and a common agent when monitoring is centralized.
Again, we can deﬁne by pc(·) the individual monitoring eﬀort of a given principal that solves
the problem of a principal and minimizes the total cost of monitoring given qc(·). It is easy to
check that pc(θ) is uniquely characterized by






Modeling issues: Two aspects of centralized monitoring under non-cooperative contracting
encourage principals to increase monitoring. First, each principal exploits the agent’s role as a
communication channel to reap some beneﬁts from the other principal’s contract. Second, each
principal can aﬀect total monitoring eﬀort q directly by changing only his own contract, which
relies on the assumption that each principal is committed to increase his eﬀort as needed to support
the chosen q. In equilibrium, this implies that each principal increases his individual eﬀort pk by
a unit when the other raises his by a unit, i.e., there is no free riding in monitoring eﬀorts.
If the principals chose their individual eﬀorts pk independently, the contract oﬀered by each
principal will have to be based on his own monitoring eﬀort pk only instead of q. Ap r i n c i p a l ,
then, would not be able to aﬀect q d i r e c t l yb yc h a n g i n go n l yh i so w nc o n t r a c tw i t ht h ea g e n t .H e
would have to rely on the other principal’s eﬀort too, which would be strategically chosen and
may not increase as much as desired. The positive externality from each others’ contract would
also be weaker. We study these issues in the next section.
5 Non-Cooperative Contracts and Decentralized Monitoring Ef-
forts
In a monitoring context where no common institution can be constructed to extract the returns
of the project, the theme of free riding in monitoring eﬀorts becomes central. This issue could not
be addressed under centralized monitoring since we assumed that the principals could verify each
15other’s eﬀorts. Here we allow the principals to choose their eﬀorts independently. For example
each principal could hire his own lawyers to put pressure on the agent to pay out income even
if the total amount of income that can be extracted is the result of the joint eﬀorts. Hence, we
consider a situation with an even greater incompleteness of contracts than in the previous section:
not only do the principals not coordinate in choosing transfers, but each principal does not observe
the eﬀort of the other in monitoring the common agent. We ﬁnd that there will be free riding
in monitoring eﬀorts, which means that a unit increase in pk is associated with a less than one
unit increase in pj6=k. This leads to a number of results. First, there is less monitoring than in
the case of centralized monitoring which makes the agent better oﬀ. Second, and perhaps more
striking is the existence of equilibria where the monitoring level is lower than under the merged
principals benchmark. That is non-cooperative contracting does not necessarily lead to too much
monitoring. Third, free riding in monitoring eﬀorts leads to a collapse of monitoring for high
proﬁt levels; there is no monitoring if proﬁt is above a threshold and principals rely instead on a
constant transfer to extract income in these states. This happens mainly because free riding in
monitoring weakens the incentive externality between the principals.
Contract setting: Under this setting, which we refer to as decentralized monitoring, the
principals’ monitoring eﬀorts pk for k =1 ,2 are set non-cooperatively, and one principal’s eﬀort
pk is unobservable by the other principal. Each principal incurs his own cost of eﬀort C(pk). Hence
the indirect mechanisms we consider stipulate a repayment, denoted by tk(pk), to each Pk based
directly on his monitoring eﬀort. Given the pair of contracts tk(pk) for k =1 ,2, the agent picks
the transfer and associated monitoring eﬀort to be implemented by each principal and privately
discloses the pair (tk,p k) only to Pk. The principals share equally the fraction q of the extracted
proﬁt θ. We will look for a Nash equilibrium in diﬀerentiable contracts {td
1(p1),t d
2(p2)} where the
superscript refers to the equilibrium values for the decentralized case.
Free riding in monitoring – anticipating the agent’s choice given td
2(p2): Again, we
want to compute the best response of P1 given the equilibrium oﬀer td
2(·) of principal 2. A key step
is to anticipate the agent’s choice of p2 for any given p1 that P1 wants to implement. For this, it
is useful to ﬁrst deﬁne the following indirect utility function, given P2’s equilibrium contract:
v(p1,θ)=m a x
p2
(1 − p1)(1 − p2)θ − td
2(p2) for all (p1,θ). (17)
Note that 1 − q =( 1− p1)(1 − p2), remembering the deﬁnition of q. The function v(·) represents
the agent’s earning aside from the transfer payment to principal P1, given P2’s contract td
2(·). This
is all that matters from P1’s point of view to assess the costs and beneﬁts of changing his own
contract with the agent. Note that treating v(·) as the agent’s privately known “income”, we can
consider P1’s problem with the agent as a “one principal-one agent” problem. We ﬁrst characterize
the agent’s choice of p2, denoted by p∗
2(p1,θ), for any p1 that P1 could want to implement, and
16then we present P1’s problem in which this response p∗
2(p1,θ) is anticipated.
The maximand in (17) is concave if td00
2 (·) is positive, and in the Appendix we show this to be
true in equilibrium.19 Assuming this for now, we obtain the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to
p2 that deﬁnes the agent’s choice p∗
2(p1,θ) when it is positive:
θ(1 − p1)=−td0
2 (p∗
2 (p1,θ)) for all (p1,θ). (18)
Note that we can also use this condition to calculate the marginal incentive cost of inducing an
increase in monitoring eﬀort just like we did in the previous sections. Again, the reduction in
td
2(·) captures P2’s marginal incentive cost of inducing a unit increase in p2 on top of the direct
marginal cost C0(p2). Condition (18) shows that this incentive cost for P2 is inversely related
to the other principal’s eﬀort p1. This is because of wasteful duplication in principals’ eﬀorts,
∂2q
∂p1∂p2 < 0:in response to an increase in p1, the agent increases p2 to reduce q the part of income
that will be veriﬁed.20 In the Appendix, we also show that
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1 in equilibrium, which is rather
intuitive. It simply means that although p1 and p2 are complements, they are only imperfect
complements. In the centralized case of Section 4, we assumed that each principal could aﬀect
the total monitoring eﬀort q(·) by his choice of tk(·), given the other principal’s contract. Thus,
each principal’s monitoring eﬀort was identically aﬀected and in that case
∂p∗
2
∂p1 equaled one by
assumption. In contrast, under decentralized eﬀorts, principals cannot verify each other’s eﬀort,
and thus each can aﬀect only his own individual eﬀort pk(·). Then, we ﬁnd that each principal
only increases his own pk(·) by less than a unit for a unit increase in the other principal’s eﬀort
pj(·). This means that the principals free ride on each other when providing monitoring eﬀorts.
As we will see below, it implies that the incentive externality from the other principal’s contract
is weakened, which in turn leads to low levels of monitoring and high proﬁtl e v e l sn o tb e i n g
monitored at all.
The result that the principals’ eﬀorts are imperfect complements is implied by the fact that
the principals cannot verify each other’s eﬀorts, and they free ride in providing incentive to the
agent to choose higher monitoring eﬀorts. To see why, let us return to the centralized monitoring
case where the principals can verify each others eﬀorts. Instead of viewing the transfers to each
principal as functions of the overall eﬀort level q, one may as well (using the fact that principals
19As we will see below, the equilibrium schedule t
d
2(·) is only right diﬀerentiable at zero and a more precise analysis
is called for to take into account this corner issue. We address this issue in the Appendix.




∂p1 < 0, i.e., monitoring eﬀorts would be strategic substitutes. Free riding would then take the extreme
form of crowding out the other principal’s eﬀort. In equilibrium, there would be even less monitoring and a larger
interval without monitoring. However, ensuring that the agent’s problem is globally concave is more diﬃcult with
strategic substitutes than with strategic complements. See Martimort (1992) and Stole (1997) for more on this
topic.
17can verify each others’ eﬀorts) view these transfers as functions of the individual eﬀort levels,
w h i c hb ys y m m e t r yi st h es a m ef o rb o t hp r i n c i p a l s ,n a m e l yp such that q =( 2 − p)p. Then,
the contracts t∗ (q)=tc ((2 − p)p) form an equilibrium pair. The agent’s choice of a common
probability of monitoring p(θ) now solves
p(θ) = argmax
p (1 − p)
2 θ − 2t∗ (p) for all θ,
which leads to the ﬁrst order condition
θ(1 − p∗ (θ)) = −t∗0 (p∗ (θ)) for all θ, (19)
which is just (12) rewritten as a symmetric equilibrium. Let us now return to the decentralized
case where principals cannot verify each others eﬀorts. If one principal, say P2, were to oﬀer







2(p1,θ)) < 1. This is derived by using t∗ (·) in (18) and noting that by diﬀerentiating
(19) with respect to θ implies t∗00 (p∗ (θ)) =
−1+p∗(θ)+θ ˙ p∗(θ)
˙ p∗(θ) .
N o ww em o v eo nt os e tu pa n ds o l v eP1’s problem. Standard methods for a single-principal
problem can be employed remembering that, given td
2(·), the agent’s retained earning equals
v(θ,p 1). Using the indirect utility formulation in (17), the agent’s rent is rewritten as
U(θ)=m a x
p1
v(p1,θ) − t1(p1) for all θ, (20)
from which we obtain by the Envelope Theorem
˙ U (θ)=vθ(p1(θ),θ),
=( 1 − p1(θ))(1 − p∗
2(p1(θ),θ)) for all θ, (21)
where vθ(·) denotes the partial derivative of v(·) with respect to θ. Even though this incentive
constraint has a form similar to that of the previous incentive constraint (5), it now depends on
p∗
2(p1(θ),θ) which in turn depends on the endogenously determined schedule td
2(·). Hence, the local
second-order suﬃcient condition (SOSC) may appear to be more complex than in the centralized
case. However, since p1 and p2 are complements, we show in the Appendix that the local SOSC
can be simpliﬁed to get the simple monotonicity condition:
˙ p1(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. (22)
Note that the corresponding total eﬀort q in a symmetric equilibrium where both principals
exert the same eﬀort can be written as qd(θ)=pd(θ)(2−pd(θ)). Using this notation we can state
the following results that characterize our main ﬁndings regarding decentralized monitoring.
18Proposition 3 When the principals compete in both contracts and monitoring eﬀorts, there is
a continuum of symmetric equilibria assuming concavity of each principal’s problems.21 Every
symmetric equilibrium entails:
• A monitoring eﬀort pd(θ) for each principal which is non-increasing in θ; there exists ˆ θ such
that θ < ˆ θ < ¯ θ and pd(θ)=0for θ > ˆ θ, i.e., no monitoring occurs for proﬁt levels above ˆ θ.
• A total monitoring eﬀort that is smaller than in the centralized case, qd(θ) <q c(θ) for
θ ∈ (θ,¯ θ).22
• A total payment,
qθ
2 +tk(pk(θ)), from the agent to each principal that is non-decreasing and
concave in θ with payments being constant for θ > ˆ θ; this total payment is smaller than the
payment in the centralized case for all θ > θ.
Proof In the Appendix.




∂p1 < 1, that generates the diﬀerence in results between the centralized and
decentralized cases. Free riding has an impact via two sources: (i) a unit increase in p1 results
in less than a unit increase in q, and (ii) the incentive externality, which is the reduction in the
cost of providing incentive due to the other principal’s contract, is also smaller. The ﬁrst eﬀect
results in a lower amount of monitoring relative to the centralized case, and the second results in
the collapse of monitoring for high income levels.
We can provide some details of the argument by focusing on the condition determining the
optimal p1 that P1 would like to implement as a best response to td
2(·), the equilibrium contract
of P2. This condition is given as (32) in the Appendix. Suppressing arguments of functions where





























w h e r et h er i g h th a n ds i d er e p r e s e n t st h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto fi n c r e a s i n gp1.23 This marginal beneﬁt
is composed of two expressions, with the ﬁrst one reﬂecting the impact on q and the extraction of
income, while the second captures the eﬀect of the externality from P2’s contract. Now we examine
each of these two parts in detail starting with the ﬁrst. Note that (1 − p2) is the derivative of q
21The exact condition is (35) in the appendix.
22The equilibrium schedule q
d (θ) that begins at q










=0for every solution q
d (θ).
23The inequality in (23) is used to capture the fact that, in this decentralized contracting setting, the optimal
solution can be at a zero corner.
19with respect to p1. An increase in p1 increases q directly, and also indirectly via p∗
2(·); the terms
in the square brackets capture this increase in q. Note that the eﬀect on q via p∗
2(·) is a bit muted
due to free riding. As a result of an increase in q, the agent’s rent is reduced by 1−F
f , but θ
2




2 (·) > 0 represents the positive incentive externality from P2’s
contract. This externality is diﬀerent from that under centralized monitoring since now P2 can
only observe a change in his own eﬀort p2, whereas under centralized monitoring it was assumed
that he could observe changes in total eﬀort q. An increase in p1 leads to an increase in p2,
and given his equilibrium contract tc
2(·), P2 asks for a lower transfer. But because
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1, the
positive externality stemming from the other principal’s contract is somewhat counteracted by







, monitoring would end at θ∗,d e ﬁned by condition (15), due to the leakage of θ
2.
To see the eﬀect of
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1 more clearly, let us substitute td0
2 (·) in (23) using (18), and note
that in a symmetric equilibrium we have pd
1(θ)=p∗



























Condition (24) precisely captures the diﬀerence between the centralized and the decentralized
cases of monitoring. Indeed, under centralized monitoring, the minimization of the monitoring







∂p1 =1in condition (24) yields pd(θ)=pc(θ), as can be veriﬁed by remembering (16).
Of course, the non-observability of the monitoring eﬀort of P2 by P1 makes such commitment
impossible; in equilibrium, we have free riding and
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1. The diﬀerence between pd(θ) and
pc(θ) reﬂects this new incompleteness. Since p2 and p1 are only imperfect complements, one would
suspect that there will be less monitoring in the decentralized case, i.e., pd(θ) will lie below pc(θ).
While the above comparison is quite intuitive, it is not all that can be inferred from inserting
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1 in condition (24). Note that the marginal beneﬁto fr a i s i n gp1 is negative for θ close to ¯ θ,
and hence, there is no monitoring for high values of θ. Then condition (21) implies that ˙ Ud(θ)=1
for these values, and we immediately obtain that the total payment is constant for such levels
of proﬁts. Under centralized monitoring, we found that the incentive externality from the other
principal was large enough in condition (14) to make monitoring optimal for all θ < ¯ θ. Here, with
∂p∗
2
∂p1 < 1, the incentive externality is not strong enough to overcome the leakage of θ
2 to the other
principal for all income levels. Since pk decreases with θ, condition (18) shows that the marginal
incentive cost increases with θ, and each principal ﬁnds it prohibitively costly to implement a
positive level of monitoring for high θ.
Insert Figure 2 here.
20With centralized monitoring, the principals are forced to compete only in the repayments they
request from the common agent. A deviation by either principal from the cooperative outcome
can only take the form of a marginal decrease in the repayment asked by this principal in exchange
of a higher monitoring eﬀort. Since principals only bear half of the joint cost of monitoring, they
tend to monitor excessively. Instead, with decentralized monitoring, the principals compete both
in the repayments they request from the agent and the monitoring eﬀort. Since each principal
beneﬁts from an increase in total monitoring eﬀort, but only contributes partially to it, there is
a free-riding problem and individual monitoring eﬀorts decrease with respect to the centralized
setting. In particular, this free riding makes monitoring prohibitively costly when income is high
and principals rely on constant transfers.
Structure of equilibria: Having said that the upper bound on the set of outcomes pd(θ)
is given by the hypothetical case,
∂p∗
2




∂p1 =0 . In this case the common agent would not change the amount
of monitoring he chooses for P2 as P1 changes his own eﬀort p1, i.e.,
∂p∗
2
∂p1 =0 . This contractual
outcome can be viewed as an “equilibrium” of a quasi-game where each principal is “myopic” and
b e l i e v e s( w r o n g l y )t h a th ec a n n o ti n ﬂuence the agent’s choice within the menu proposed by the




and it would entail a symmetric monitoring eﬀort pL(θ) deﬁned by









for θ ≤ θ∗ and zero otherwise, where θ∗ is deﬁned by (15). Of course, the common agent always
modiﬁes his choice of p2 (even if it is only by a small amount in some equilibria corresponding to
low levels of monitoring) when P1 changes his own p1. Thus one suspects that any equilibrium
outcome pd(θ) always lies above pL(θ).
In the Appendix, we show that these intuitions are indeed correct, and that all symmetric equi-
libria can be ranked with respect to the monitoring eﬀort. Any such equilibrium lies within these
two boundaries pL(θ) and pc(θ) deﬁned above. Note that, as principals behave more “myopically”,
contracts look more like debt contracts with larger ﬂat parts.
The fact that there exists a continuum of equilibria is indicative of the prominent role that
players’ expectations play in this decentralized environment. In the low equilibria, close to pL(θ),




close to zero and his own best response is close to pL(θ). Alternatively, the non-linear equilibrium
schedule td(·) is extremely convex for such equilibria (td00(·) is high) so that principals almost
commit not to change their monitoring eﬀorts too much as θ varies.
Instead, for high equilibria, close to pc(θ), each principal monitors a lot because he expects
21the other to do so as well, and his own best response is close to pc(θ). The non-linear equilibrium
schedule td(·) is less convex (td00(·) is small) so that the agent reacts a lot to a change in monitoring
eﬀort by each principal. If a principal, say P1, envisions deviating by reducing his individual
monitoring eﬀort, the agent will choose to reduce also signiﬁcantly the monitoring eﬀort he requests
of P2. We are close to the case of centralized monitoring, which is characterized by an over-provision
of monitoring eﬀort.
Since there is less monitoring, less information rent is extracted under decentralized monitoring,
compared to the centralized case, and we have:
Uc(θ) <U d(θ) for all θ > θ.
Being forced to compete also in monitoring eﬀorts to extract income makes the principals weaker:
as the proverb goes “the onlooker gets the better of a ﬁght”, and the agent is better oﬀ.
The equilibrium under decentralized monitoring can be also compared with the cooperative
outcome achieved under the merged principals benchmark. In particular we obtain the following
result:







2. Noting that pL (θ) is deﬁned by (25),t a k ea n y
symmetric equilibrium pd(θ) under decentralized monitoring:
• if pd(θ) ∈ [pL(θ),p m(θ)],t h e npd(θ) <p m(θ) for all θ in [θ,¯ θ] (there exist decentralized
equilibria where there is less monitoring than under the cooperative or merged principals
case).
• if pd(θ) ∈ (pm(θ),p c(θ)), then there exists ˜ θ such that θ < ˜ θ < ¯ θ and pd(θ) ≥ pm(θ) if
and only if θ ∈ [θ,˜ θ] (there is no symmetric decentralized equilibrium that involves more
monitoring than under the merged principals case for all proﬁt levels).
Proof In the Appendix.
The proposition shows that equilibria under decentralized contracting exhibit a strong ten-








2, the decentralized equilibria pd (θ) that start below pm (θ), stay below pm (θ)
throughout. Even those equilibria corresponding to relatively ﬂat nonlinear schedules t(q) (i.e.,
those with a high pd(θ)) fall below the cooperative outcome for suﬃciently high levels of proﬁt.
This feature of the equilibrium captures again the two externalities at play when principals do not
merge. On the one hand, there might be excessive monitoring because each principal only bears
half of the incentive cost from monitoring exactly as if the monitoring eﬀort was veriﬁable by both
22principals. This eﬀect might dominate for low levels of proﬁt, i.e., when monitoring is crucial at
least for some equilibria. On the other hand, there is too little monitoring because of free riding
when monitoring eﬀorts are non-veriﬁable and this eﬀect always dominates in any equilibrium for
suﬃciently high levels of proﬁts, i.e., when monitoring is less of an issue anyway.
Welfare: Recall that if we take as measure of total welfare the sum of the two principals and
the agent’s payoﬀs, we can easily observe that total welfare is maximized when the expected cost
of the monitoring eﬀorts is minimized. The ranking of equilibria that we have found above leads us
immediately to state that welfare is maximum in the lowest symmetric equilibrium of the decen-
tralized case. In particular it is larger than even that under the merged case since some symmetric
equilibria lie strictly below pm(θ) for all θ in [θ,¯ θ) (i.e., those such that pd(θ) ∈ [pL(θ),p m(θ)] under
the assumption of Proposition 4). Also, every symmetric decentralized equilibrium dominates the
equilibrium under centralized monitoring from a welfare point of view. Thus, in our framework, if
contracting cannot be coordinated, welfare is higher when monitoring is also uncoordinated. While
the welfare eﬀect of a merger between two principals with centralized monitoring is positive, a
merger of two principals that compete both in contracts and monitoring eﬀorts has ambiguous
welfare implications.
Proﬁt of the principals: It is also interesting to compare the diﬀerent cases or institutional
arrangements in terms of the aggregate proﬁts of the principals. Given that the principals are
indispensable providers of the initial up-front investment, this may be viewed as a more relevant
measure of welfare. Since θ is exogenous, the best arrangement should achieve the minimal value of
the overall costs, including ﬁrst monitoring costs but also the expected information rent left to the
agent. The best arrangement would be our benchmark where the principals merge and minimize
the sum of these two costs at pm(θ). Note that even though some decentralized outcomes pd (θ)
have lower amount of monitoring than pm (θ) (Proposition 4), these decentralized outcomes are
inferior to pm (θ) from the principals’ viewpoint as they do not adequately account for the cost of
rent left to the agent.
The comparison between decentralized and centralized monitoring is less trivial and an inter-
esting trade-oﬀ emerges. Indeed, we know from Proposition 4 that, in some equilibria pd(θ) is
closer to the cooperative outcome pm(θ) than pc(θ), for low levels of proﬁts whereas pc(θ) is closer
to pm(θ) for high levels close to ¯ θ. This suggests that centralized (resp. decentralized) monitoring
may be preferred when the distribution of proﬁt puts enough (resp. little) weight on high levels
of proﬁts. Using this intuition, we construct in the Appendix (subsection 7.6) an example to
show that there exist parameter conﬁgurations such that the sum of proﬁts for the two principals
can be higher under either centralized or decentralized monitoring. Therefore, either monitor-
ing arrangement could be preferable from the principals’ viewpoint depending on the underlying
23fundamentals of the problem.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We have considered the problem of multiple principals attempting to obtain income from a pri-
vately informed agent and designing their respective ﬁnancial contracts non-cooperatively. A
contribution of our analysis is to note that information problems between the monitors can aﬀect
ﬁnancial contracts. The degree of coordination between these principals, stemming from the ob-
servability of their monitoring eﬀorts, has strong implications for the shapes of ﬁnancial contracts.
Equity is more useful when there are few information problems between principals and monitor-
ing can be credibly delegated or centralized. This is more likely to happen in publicly-traded
companies where there are rules to guarantee a coordinated access to proﬁts. When instead the
idiosyncratic nature of the activity ﬁnanced (e.g. in privately held companies) makes it impossible
to rely on a common set of monitoring rules and forces the principals to monitor independently,
free riding will render monitoring so costly to make it convenient to use debt-like payments where
high levels of income are not monitored at all. Our ﬁnding is consistent with a well known result
from the corporate ﬁnance literature (see for example the survey by Harris and Raviv (1991))
according to which debt is more likely used than equity in situations with information problems.
This is because debt is relatively insensitive to ﬁrm performance and is likely to be priced more
accurately than equity in situations involving asymmetric information.
Our analysis could be extended along several lines. First, we have abstracted from any moral
hazard issues by assuming that the size of proﬁt is exogenous and not aﬀected by any eﬀort from
the agent. Those considerations would lead to more complex modelling issues where principals
have a common interest in inducing the agent to exert eﬀort. The common agency equilibrium
would highlight not only the features described here but also would exhibit some free riding
between the principals in providing the agent correct incentives to exert eﬀort as in pure common
agency environments with moral hazard.24 One may guess that this added scope for free riding
will reduce the agent’s eﬀort and thus his proﬁt, making monitoring by the principals less of an
issue.
Second, a natural extension of our framework should account for some asymmetry between
the principals who could diﬀer in terms of their cost of monitoring or according to the dates at
which they contract with the agent. Asymmetry could be useful in explaining how the degree
of monitoring performed by diﬀerent principals is linked to their priority in contracting with the
agent.
24See Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
24Third, while our approach is similar to the CSV literature, there are two diﬀerences. In the
CSV literature a strong emphasis is put on direct revelation mechanisms: the privately informed
agent makes a report of his privately realized income and an audit is used to ex post check the
veracity of this claim through a costly bankruptcy procedure. In our model instead, we focus
on indirect mechanisms, or menus linking the repayments made to the monitoring eﬀorts. As
mentioned above although the two approaches are equivalent in the case of a single principal,
the use of direct revelation mechanisms is restrictive in common agency environments as shown
by Peters (2001, 2003) and Martimort and Stole (2002). The second diﬀerence with the CSV
approach is that our model of monitoring is not limited to an interpretation of auditing and
bankruptcies alone. Instead we allow for a broader interpretation by deﬁning monitoring as a
range of actions that occur ex post to verify and recover realized income, an approach that can be
applied to model ongoing monitoring activity in healthy enterprises. 25 However, it is possible to
relate our ﬁrst two models directly to the CSV approach and the outcomes would be identical. We
would only need to specify the contract diﬀerently. If we interpret q as the probability of an audit
that reveals true income, then we can specify a repayment function r(q) when there is no audit.
Then our repayment function t(q)=( 1− q)r(q) is interpreted as the payment unconditional on
an audit.26
Fourth, we could also extend the number of principals involved. As this number increases,
the various eﬀects stressed in the paper are exacerbated. In the case of centralized monitoring,
the intensity of monitoring increases quickly with this number, making repayment a less useful
screening tool when principals are dispersed but remain strategic. As far as decentralized
contracting is concerned, free riding is more of a problem as the number of principals increases.
One might expect that principals will behave more myopically in such environments and that the
no-monitoring regions would be enhanced.
Finally, although our focus has been on ﬁnancial contracting, this framework can be used to
analyze other instances in which several principals monitor a common agent, like in labor contexts,
banking supervision, consumer credit, development aid agencies, tax authorities, etc. Since tax
collection also involves extracting income from an informed agent, our model can also be used to
analyze the issues of competition between tax jurisdictions. Our analysis shows that tax collection
by diﬀerent jurisdictions depend on their ability to coordinate both the tax schedules and their
collection eﬀorts, an issue often neglected in the discussions over the harmonization of taxation
25See Hart (1995) for a critique of the CSV approach. He also observes that the audit costs implied by the CSV
approach may be too large to be consistent with observed bankruptcy costs.
26Our model of decentralized monitoring is not amenable to an interpretation of a CSV model because the q
depends on both principals’ eﬀorts p1 and p2, so that r(·) would become a function of the unveriﬁed eﬀort of the
other principal.
25across countries. More generally ours is an example of an agency problem with multiple con-
stituencies. The strategic interactions between them shape the governance arrangements between
the various stakeholders of a ﬁrm as well as some of the institutional mechanisms that society
develops to monitor individuals.
7A p p e n d i x
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 If C00(pk) >
C0(pk)







, and ˜ C(q) strictly convex with ˜ C0 (0) = 0, and ˜ C00 (0) > 0.
Proof









Then diﬀerentiating w.r.t. p1 yields the FOC (after replacing p2)
(1 − p1)C0 (p1)=( 1− p2)C0 (p2).
If C00(pk) >
C0(pk)
(1−pk), the expression (1 − pk)C0 (pk) is increasing in pk and the maximand is quasi-

































with ˜ C0 (0) = 2C0(0) = 0, and ˜ C00 (0) = 2C00(0) > 0.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1







− ˜ C (q(θ)) + θq(θ)+t(q(θ))
´
dθ (Pm)
s.t. (3), (4), (5) and (6).
26As it is standard in the principal-agent literature, we will ﬁrst neglect the constraint (6) and check












(1 − q(θ))(1 − F(θ)dθ, (26)
where the ﬁnal equality is derived using integration by parts.
Standard arguments show that the principal’s payoﬀ is maximized when U(θ)=0 .U s i n g
(3) to replace t(·) in the principal’s objective function and using (26), we can ﬁnally simplify the












By Lemma 1, we have ˜ C(·) convex so that the principal’s problem is concave. Point-wise





giving the optimal monitoring eﬀort for each θ.
Note that our Inada assumptions on the cost function implies that q is positive for all types
except the highest proﬁto n e¯ θ,a n d0 <q<1 f o ra l lo t h e rt y p e s .S i n c e
1−F(θ)
f(θ) is non-increasing
and ˜ C00(q) > 0, the monotonicity condition (6) is satisﬁed by qm(θ).
The total payment from the agent to the principal is qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)), and we show below





from (3) and (5) the total payment, denoted by Rm(θ), is given by
Rm(θ)=qm(θ)θ + tm(q(θ)) = θ − Um(θ),
which implies that ˙ R(θ)=1− ˙ Um(θ)=qm(θ) ≥ 0, and that ˙ R(θ) is non-increasing in θ since
˙ qm(θ) ≤ 0.
277.3 Proof of Proposition 2



















s.t. (11), (4), (5) and (6).
It should be clear that problem (Pc
1) is quite similar to problem (Pm) modulo the fact that P1
has now no control on tc
2(·). Ignoring (6) for now and proceeding as in the case of the merged













+ θ − tc






Let us suppose that tc
2(q) is convex in q so that principal 1’s problem is concave. We will check
ex post that this concavity property is satisﬁed. Point-wise optimization of this maximand yields












Next we characterize the equilibrium monitoring eﬀort q(·) and argue that we have a symmetric
equilibrium in the contracts. Following similar steps as in the case for P1, we can indeed derive
the best response for P2 to a given t1(·), which is symmetric to P1’s best response. Then using
the two best responses and the agent’s ﬁrst-order condition (12), we characterize the equilibrium
monitoring eﬀort, which is presented in the condition (13):






As in the cooperative case, the monotonicity of the hazard rate implies that qc(θ) is non-increasing
as required by the condition (6).
The principals’ best responses imply that the equilibrium transfers are symmetric since the
outcome qc(θ) is unique and tc
k(qc(θ)) = θ(1 − qc(θ)),f o rk =1 ,2.
Immediate comparison of (8) with (13) shows that there is excessive monitoring eﬀort when
the principals compete in contracts even though monitoring eﬀorts are coordinated in each case:
qc(θ) >q m(θ) for all θ
except for the highest proﬁtl e v e l¯ θ where they are both equal to zero.














The derivative of the total payment with respect to θ is qc(θ) ≥ 0, which is non-increasing in θ.I t
immediately follows from the comparison of qm (θ) and qc (θ) that total payment is higher under
centralized monitoring for all θ > θ.
Note also that, in a symmetric equilibrium, we have tc0(q)=−
θc(q)
2 where θc(q) is the inverse
function of qc(θ).T h u s , w e g e t tc00(q)=−
θc0(q)
2 > 0 and thus tc(q) is convex validating the
concavity of each principal’s maximization problem.
7.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We will prove the proposition in several stages. In subsection 7.4.1, we begin by characterizing
the SOSC as indicated prior to presenting the condition (22). Then we present the principal’s
problem in subsection 7.4.2, compute the ﬁrst-order condition and obtain some results, namely:




∂p1 < 1, i.e., there is free riding. In subsection 7.4.3 we characterize the set
of symmetric solutions pd(θ) and show that (i) the ignored conditions (22) are satisﬁed, (ii) that
pc(θ) >p d(θ) for θ ∈ (θ,¯ θ), and (iii) for each solution pd(θ), there exists a ˆ θ < ¯ θ such that there
will be no monitoring for θ > ˆ θ. Then we study more precisely the issue of the corner at zero in
subsection 7.4.4, before moving on and checking in subsection 7.4.5 that local incentive constraints
imply global incentive compatibility. The issue there is that the “single-crossing property” depends
on p∗
2(·), which is endogenous in this common agency environment, but strategic complementarity
of the principals’ eﬀorts ensures that we do not encounter any problem. Finally, we demonstrate
that the total payment functions are indeed concave as claimed.
7.4.1 Condition SOSC (22)
Given the other principal’s contract t2(p2), there is no loss of generality in applying the Revelation
Principle to compute P1’s best response in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium between the princi-
29pals.27 We will thus construct the best response (t1(θ),p 1(θ)) in terms of a direct mechanism. In
equilibrium, we will show that p1(θ) is invertible when p1(θ) > 0, using which we will associate to
this direct mechanism a nonlinear schedule t1(p1).
Focusing on the direct mechanism (t1(θ),p 1(θ)) for the moment, standard arguments imply
that the local FOC for the agent’s problem writes as:
˙ t1(θ)+˙ p1(θ)vp(θ,p 1(θ)) = 0 for all θ. (30)






















f (θ)[−C (p1 (θ)) +
θ
2
(1 − (1 − p1(θ))(1 − p∗
2 (p1 (θ),θ))) + t1 (p1(θ))]dθ (Pd
1)
s.t. (4),(17),(18),(20),(21),and (22).




(1 − p1 (x))(1 − p∗
2 (p1,x))dx. (31)
We will ignore condition (22) for now and show later that it is indeed satisﬁed by the equilibrium
schedule. After using the indirect utility function (20) to substitute t1(·), we can substitute U(θ)





f (θ)[−C (p1 (θ)) +
θ
2













2 (p1 (θ),θ) satisﬁes (18).
In the remainder of the proof, we suppress θ where obvious. Assuming concavity of the principal’s
problem, point-wise optimization yields the following ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal p1(θ),
27See Martimort and Stole (2002) for this argument.
30denoted by pd












































































































This condition depends on the equilibrium strategy and is thus hard to derive from exogenous
parameters. We will thus assume that it is satisﬁed in what follows.
Let us look for a symmetric equilibrium with td (·)=td
1 (·)=td
2 (·) and pd(·)=pd
1(·)=pd
2(·).
For θ such that pd(θ) > 0 and p∗
2(pd

























U s i n g( 1 8 )w eh a v ef o ra l lθ,w h e r epd(θ) > 0,
θ
³







which after diﬀerentiation w.r.t. θ yields










1 − pd − ˙ pdθ
. (38)
Since ˙ pd(θ) ≤ 0, as required by the local SOSC (22), the above expression establishes two results:




Hence, using (38) to replace td00(·) in (36) yields the following diﬀerential equation satisﬁed by

























31A priori, the solution to this diﬀerential equation, denoted by s(θ), does not need to remain
positive (as is required for pd(θ)) .H e n c ew eu s et h ed i ﬀerent notation to distinguish s(θ) from the
equilibrium schedule pd(θ). We intend to prove that pd (θ)=m a x{s(θ),0}. To deﬁne the solutions
to this diﬀerential equation for all values of θ,w ew i l le x t e n dC (s) for s<0. The continuously
diﬀerentiable extension C (s)=0for s<0 does the job. Once a solution, denoted by s(θ),t ot h i s
diﬀerential equation is obtained, it cannot be positive again once it touches zero since it is weakly
decreasing. We then have to check that pd (θ)=m a x{s(θ),0}, i.e., there is a corner at zero in the
optimum of the principal’s objective.


















Let us now analyze the properties of s(θ), the solutions to (40).
Note ﬁrst that the initial value s(θ) is not deﬁned a priori. The initial value s(θ) is thus
chosen to guarantee that the whole schedule s(θ) satisﬁes the local SOSC.
7.4.3 Comparative Statics
See Figure 2 for this. Let us note that the numerator (resp. denominator) of the RHS above is
equal to zero for pL(θ) (resp. pc(θ)), where pL(θ) is deﬁned in (25). Note that pc(θ) is deﬁned




. Instead, pL (θ) is strictly positive only for θ ∈ [θ,θ∗], where θ∗ is deﬁned by




.B o t h pc(θ) and pL(θ) are decreasing with θ and
pc(θ) >p L(θ) for all θ ∈ [θ,¯ θ). From (40), s(θ) is non-increasing as long as s(θ) remains in the
interval [pL(θ),p c(θ)].
Let us take s(θ) ∈ [pL(θ),p c(θ)] and consider the solution to (40) with this initial value. We
claim that such a solution is strictly decreasing and always remains within (pL(θ),p c(θ)). Indeed,
if it crosses pL(θ) at any θ1 ∈ (θ,θ∗) for the ﬁrst time, we should have ˙ s(θ1)=0 , but then
s(θ) <p L(θ) for θ ∈ (θ1 − ε,θ1) for ε small enough; a contradiction.




for the ﬁrst time, we should have ˙ s(θ2)=∞, but then
s(θ) >p c(θ) for θ2 ∈ (θ2,θ2 + ε) for ε small enough; a contradiction since the trajectories do not
go through ¯ θ.
Since all initial values s(θ) in [pL(θ),p c(θ)] correspond to possible solutions to (40),a l lt h e s e




, where ˆ θ is deﬁned by
s(ˆ θ)=0for any given s(·) and ˆ θ < ¯ θ. These schedules correspond to equilibria which can be
ranked from low to high depending on their initial value pd(θ).
327.4.4 Corner at zero
Let us now tackle more precisely the issue of the corner at zero. So far indeed, we have implicitly
assumed that P1 only induces the agent, whatever his proﬁtl e v e lθ, to choose a positive monitoring
intensity p∗
2(p1,θ) from P2 . W em u s ti n v e s t i g a t ew h a th a p p e n sw h e nP1 chooses to induce
p∗
2(p1,θ)=0 .
Indeed, take any supposed equilibrium pd(θ). For θ > ˆ θ we have pd(θ)=0and when, say P1,
deviates and makes an alternative oﬀer to the common agent, he may want to have the agent
choose p∗
2(p1,θ)=0 . Note that this occurs when
−θ(1 − p1) ≤ td0(0) = −ˆ θ,
where the equality follows from the deﬁnition of ˆ θ and continuity of td0
(·) at ˆ θ. Hence, such
deviation occurs as long as p1 ≤ 1−
ˆ θ
θ. For θ < ˆ θ, there is no such deviation with p1 > 0 inducing
the agent to choose p∗















because θ ≥ ˆ θ ≥ θ
∗
. Hence, P1’s optimal choice on the set is p1 =0 .


































We know that this expression is zero at p1 = s(θ). Thus, by concavity of P1’s payoﬀ, the expression
above is negative at p1 =1−
ˆ θ
θ. Since P1’s payoﬀ is continuous at p1 =1−
ˆ θ
θ, we can deduce that
P1’s payoﬀ is maximum at p1 =0for all θ ≥ ˆ θ.
7.4.5 Global concavity
To ensure global concavity of the agent’s problem, let us write













(1 − p2) − td(p2)
o
and let us show that ∆ ≥ 0 for all (θ,θ1) in [θ,¯ θ] × [θ,¯ θ].
Using the FOC of the agent’s problem (30), we have:












































7.4.6 Concavity of total payment and comparison with centralized case












= θ − Ud(θ).







but then the second derivative is 2
¡
1 − pd (θ)
¢
˙ pd(θ) ≤ 0 as is required for concavity. Comparing
equilibrium monitoring eﬀorts we immediately see that total payment is smaller under decen-
tralized monitoring compared to the centralized case for all θ > θ. This is depicted in Figure
2.
7.5 Proof of Proposition 4
To prove both parts of the proposition, we only need to show that the trajectories of the diﬀerential
equation (39), that characterizes pd (θ), may cross the line p = pm(θ) only once from above, where
pm (θ) is given by (10). We have already argued in subsection 7.4.3 that pd (θ) cannot intersect
pc (θ) from below, and thus we also have ˜ θ < ¯ θ.




















by (10) when pd (θ1)=pm(θ1).
















Comparing (41) and (42) at a point θ1 such that pm(θ1)=pd(θ1), we observe that 0 >








Therefore, any trajectory pd (θ) starting below pm (θ) stays below pm (θ) and those starting
above pm (θ) must intersect pd (θ) once from above at some ˜ θ < ¯ θ a n dt h e ns t a y sb e l o wpm (θ).
7.6 Comparison of proﬁts between centralized and decentralized monitoring
The comparison between the two non-cooperative modes is made quite diﬃcult because it requires
ﬁrst to compute explicitly the equilibrium schedule pd(θ) which is a solution to a highly nonlinear
diﬀerential equation and, if such a solution can be characterized, to compute the expected overall
cost of the corresponding allocation. To nevertheless give an example of such a proﬁtc o m p a r i s o n
between the two non-cooperative institutional arrangements, consider the case of an exponential
distribution on [θ,+∞],F(θ)=1− e−2(θ−θ), with 0 < θ < 1 to guarantee that a positive θ∗ < 1
such that pL(θ∗)=0 . Of course, this distribution has an unbounded support, but apart from the
fact that there is ‘distortion at the top’ both under the merged and the centralized cases, all our







and ∞ otherwise so that the condition of Lemma 1 holds.
With these functional forms, the overall cost of extracting income using a monitoring schedule




















where the hazard rate
1−F(θ)
f(θ) = 1
2 for the exponential distribution. Point-wise minimization of




(1 − pm(θ)), for all θ,
which for this example is pm(θ)=1
3, and yields an expected cost ω(pm)=1
3.
From (13), under centralized monitoring, the monitoring intensity by either principal is given
by
C0(pc(θ)) = 1 − pc(θ), for all θ ≥ θ,
35i.e., pc(θ)=1
2, with an expected cost ω(pc)=3
8 which is of course greater than 1
3.
From (40) in the Appendix, under decentralized monitoring, an equilibrium schedule pd(θ) ≥ 0











with the initial conditions pd(θ) in [pL(θ), 1
2], where pL (θ) is obtained as in subsection 7.4.3 by








The nonlinearity of this diﬀerential equation makes it impossible to solve explicitly for the equilib-
rium schedules. Therefore, we use numerical methods to compute the solution pd (θ) for θ =0 .0001
and pd (θ)=1
3. Then we use this pd (θ) to calculate the implementation cost to show that w(p∗)
is strictly smaller than ω(pc)=3
8.28 Of course, this strict inequality still holds for θ small enough
for any equilibrium under decentralized monitoring which has an initial value pd(θ) in [pL(θ), 1
3].
Decentralized monitoring is thus preferred for a distribution of proﬁts putting enough weight on
low levels of proﬁt.
Let us turn to the case where θ is close to 1 from below. We then have θ∗ close to θ and
pL(θ) close to 0 everywhere. Take an equilibrium schedule pd(θ) under decentralized monitoring
with an initial value pd(θ) close to pL(θ). Such solution remains close to zero everywhere and thus
ω(pd) ≈ 1
2 > ω(pc). Centralized monitoring performs better than the decentralized arrangement.
The intuition is now the reverse image of the above case; as the distribution of proﬁt puts enough
weight on higher levels of proﬁt, centralized monitoring comes closer to the cooperative outcome.
Even with this simple example, the overall picture is quite mixed although it reﬂects our initial
intuition. First, there is incentive to monitor too much in the centralized case, and to monitor
too little in the decentralized case due to free riding; second, the former eﬀect is more relevant for
low proﬁts while the latter dominates for high proﬁts. We constructed an example to show that
if the distribution of proﬁts puts enough weight on low proﬁts, decentralized monitoring will be
preferred by the principals, while the opposite is true if the distribution puts enough weight on
high proﬁts. In general, comparisons between the two non-cooperative arrangements depend in
subtle ways on the proﬁt distribution.
28The calculated w(p
∗) is smaller than 0.35563. It was derived using the software Mathcad and the details are
available from the authors upon request.
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